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Rejecting Rational Expectations 
in Panel Da t a:
£
So m e Ne w Evidence
Til man Ehrbeck





Early empirical tests for rationality In survey expectation data 
have either used summary data and thus neglected the resulting 
aggregation bias or used individual data but ignored the likely 
correlation of forecasts due to the same aggregate shock surprising 
economic agents. Two recent papers took these problems Into account and 
arrived at exactly opposite conclusions: One rejected the Rational
Expectation Hypothesis, the other did not. This paper adds evidence 
from a new data set which features three advantages none of the 
previously used data sets could combine: (a) Names of forecasters are
given along with the forecasts so that they have an incentive to do as 
well as possible; (b) forecasters predict a quoted price so that there 
Is no ambiguity as to what they are trying to forecast; (c) forecasts 
for the same target period are made at different points in time so that 
alternative implications of the Rational Expectation Hypothesis can be 
tested. Three different tests are employed In this paper. They all 
reject the Rational Expectation Hypothesis.
• I would like to thank Professor Robert Waldmann for many helpful
discussions and suggestions as well as the participants of the EUI-Ph.D.





















































































































































































0. In tr oduct ion
Rationality of survey expectation data has been tested before. 
However, earlier papers either used summary measures such as the mean 
forecasts which are systematically biased (see Appendix 1) or they 
pooled data neglecting the likely correlation of forecast errors across 
agents.* Two recent papers took care of these problems and, 
furthermore, used the panel data to look at idiosyncratic components In 
expectations —  components that are not consistent with the conventional 
Rational Expectations Hypothesis. Their evidence Is mixed: Ito [1990J, 
studying US-$/Yen exchange rate expectations, rejected rationality of 
expectations for his data set. Conversely, Keane/Runkle (1990) did not 
reject rationality in expectations of the U.S. GNP deflator.
This paper adds evidence from a new data set, compiled from a 
commercial newsletter. The data has three features that previously used 
data could not combine: (1) Names of the forecasters are published 
along the forecasts so that there is a strong incentive to give the 
best; (2) The forecast variable is an interest rate so that none of the 
ambiguities possible with national accounting data can arise; (3) 
Forecasts of the same target period are given at different points in 
time so that alternative implications of the Rational Expectations 
Hypothesis, not previously considered, can be tested.
In section 1 of this paper, the data set used is described. Section 
2 discusses econometric issues and section 3 presents the results of 
conventional tests for unbiasedness. The data used has drawbacks in 
that the relatively short time horizon does not allow proper analysis of 
the time series properties. The expectation variable and the 
corresponding realization series both seem non-stat1onary, though 
co-integrated. The tests for unbiasedness in section 3 involve level
^Papers in the first group include Pesando [1975], Carlson (19771, and 




























































































regressions whose results must be taken with care. On the other hand, 
when testing for efficiency, the Rational Expectations Hypothesis leads 
to alternative regression specifications that imply under the null 
hypothesis statlonarity of both the regressand and the regressors. 
Section 4 reports the results of a first series of such regressions, 
testing for the presence of idiosyncratic forecast errors. Section 5 
extends the analysis, testing for the efficient use of various 
Information variables available when expectations were formed.
The usefulness of published survey data to test for rationality In 
expectations has also been questioned on different grounds. After all, 
we do not know whether survey participants act upon their predictions In 
the market place, or, whether their public announcements are the result 
of some private optimization problem other than minimizing the the 
expected forecast error. Section 6 reports the results of a regression 
equation which is derived from the Idea that survey participants when 
announcing a public forecast might want to trade off the size of their 
revisions from past announcements for truthfulness in their new, but 
unreported expectations. They might make predictions which they know 
are not optimal because they are (perhaps rationally) unwilling to admit 
they were wrong.
The tests In sections 3, 4 and 5 of this paper reject the Rational 
Expectation Hypothesis. In particular the results In the first two of 
these sections gain strength as they have only used Implications of the 
Rational Expectation Hypothesis that do not require any specification of 
the model the survey participant might have had in mind. The results in 
section 6, in turn, support the general case for analyzing survey 
expectations. Had the participants been found not to admit that they 
were wrong In previous forecasts, then the validity of the data for 






























































































The expectation data used for the empirical work in this paper 
comes from the North-Hoi land Economic Forecasts publication. This 
monthly newsletter publishes forecasts of key economic variables for 23 
industrialized or Industrializing countries. However, only the U. S. 
data Is sufficiently rich for the purpose of this work since It can be 
viewed as a small panel of expectations. The data are not summarized. 
Individual forecasts are given along with the name of the forecaster. 
There Is thus an Incentive to try to forecast as precisely as possible.
For the U.S., some 30 professional forecasters or institutions 
report their forecasts at the beginning of each month to the North 
American editorial board. The editors of the newsletter provide the 
forecasters with the latest data. When the forecasts are made, the past 
month’ government publications such as the Survey of Current Business of 
the U.S. Department of Commerce are available. I dated the time when 
the forecasts were made according to this availability of information.
The variable definitions generally coincide with those of the official 
2statistics. For the empirical work, only forecasts of those 
participants who reported at least 15 times over the sample period from 
December 1984 to June 1990 were used. The cross-section dimension of 
the data was thus reduced to N=23. The average number of non-mlsslng 
observations per participant is 18.
The expectation variable used is the forecast of the annualized 
discount rate on new issues of 91-day Treasury bills, based on weekly 
auction average rates. As all other forecasts in the newsletter, this 
rate is predicted for the quarters of the calender year. The 
corresponding realization data needed to be compiled and comes from the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin. It is calculated as a simple average of
2All details in letter from Professor Victor Zarnowltz, North American 




























































































monthly data which is in turn computed from the average weekly auction 
rate already quoted on annualized discount basis. Comparison with the 
auction data published in the press did not reveal any inconsistencies.
I About here Table 1 -- Results of a weekly auction of T—Bills]
The forecast data was split into three, small homgeneous panels of 
first month, second month, and third month forecasts resp. which give a 
sample size of T=22 for the first two months, and of T=23 for the 
third-month-of-the-quarter forecasts resp. In this paper, only current 
and one-quarter— ahead forecasts have been used. The Interest rate 
forecast data was chosen because it predicts a quoted price and thus 
some of the ambiguities that could arise when predicting national 
accounting data are excluded. In the U. S. , eg., the Commerce
Department revises its most recent data releases for two consecutive 
months and then again every year in July. The results of tests for 
rationality in Keane/Runkle, eg., depend crucially on which realization 
data is used. In their paper, survey forecasts are rational 
expectations of the early 45-day announcements of the GNP deflator made 
by the U. S. Commerce, but not of the revised data, released In July of 
each year by the same government agency.
[Here Figures 1-4 —  Average Forecasts and Average Forecast Errors]
2. Ec o n o m e t r i c Issues
In its most general form, the Rational Expectations Hypothesis 
states that economic agents' subjective probability distribution Is 
identical to the objective probability distribution of the model thought 
to be generating the variable at hand. Assuming a quadratic loss 




























































































mathematical expectations is the optimal prediction of the variable of 
3interest. Derived for optimizing agents with a quadratic loss
function, Rational Expectations must be unbiased, with serially 
uncorrelated forecast errors, orthogonal to any information known when 
the forecast was made. Tests of rationality Involve these two 
implications in one or the other form.
The following two regressions would test for unbiasedness and 
efficiency, respectively:
X = / 3  + 0 X c,t_1+ u  (1)t 0 1  t t
(X -Xe,t_1 ) = I d + v (2)t t t-i t
where X^ is the realized value of any variable of interest in time t,
X*’1 1 denotes the prediction of that variable for period t made at t-1,
I is the information set available at time t-1, d is a vector of t-i
coefficients, and u and v are n. 1.1.d error terms with zero mean and t t2 2variance <r and cr resp.
u  v
Unbiased expectations in equation (1) should yield estimates which 
do not reject the Joint hypothesis Hq: ( 0 11’— (0,11’. This is a weak 
test of rationality because it only requires that the forecast error be 
uncorrelated with the forecast. Equation (2) constitutes a stronger 
test of rationality, hypothesizing that all elements of d should be 
zero. Non-zero elements would Imply inefficient use of available
3See Appendix 2 for the derivation of this result. As a matter of fact, 
for the conditional expectation to be the optimal predictor, the loss 
function need not be quadratic. As one set of conditions, it is 
sufficient if the loss function is symmetric about the forecast error, 
if it is differentiable almost everywhere and strictly monotonlcal1y 
increasing on the whole range from -® < error < «, and if the 
conditional probability density function of X is symmetric about the 




























































































i n fo rm a t 1 on.
Note, first, that rejection of unbiasedness would not imply 
i rrat ional 1 ty if we left the linear world and if forecasters had, for 
example, an underlying asymmetric loss function. Second, testing for 
unbiasedness does not require specification of the model used by the 
forecasters nor particular assumptions on the information set. 
Conversely, testing for the efficient use of available information 
requires a priori Judgement because agents among each other (and those 
who test for their rationality) might not agree about what constitutes 
the "relevant" information set.
When implementing tests as outlined, two econometric problems arise 
that have been ignored in the early empirical literature on survey 
expectations. First, with overlapping forecast horizons, economic 
agents will not have knowledge of all previous forecast errors when 
making the next forecast; and, if they stick to some forecast rule for 
more than one period, the forecast errors will be serially correlated. 
Second, forecast errors across agents are likely to be correlated 
because they are due to the same aggregate shock hitting the economy. 
While OLS estimates in these cases are still unbiased, the 
variance/covarlance estimates of the regression coefficients could be 
downward biased if there was positive error correlation. Downward 
biased variance/covarlances estimates could lead to erroneous rejection 
of the null hypothesis.
3. Testing Fo r U nbiasedness
The tests reported in this section are on the unbiasedness of the 
forecasts. All individual forecasts were used. This increases the 
power of the regression and avoids any aggregation bias. Using summary 
measures such as the mean forecast would ignore two potential sources 




























































































each conditional on a private information set, is not Itself a rational 
forecast conditional on any particular information set. Second, 
aggregation might mask systematic ldiosyncracles which might cancel each 
other at the aggregate level.
The data was organized per time period first. Let
Y 1 X Uit It It
_ X * , U =, t t
Y 1 X uNt Nt Nt
where y is a (Nxl) vector of one period realizations, X is a (Nx2) t t
matrix with the X being the individual forecasts, b is a (2x1) vector, 
and is (Nxl) again. The data can then be stacked along time to form:
y =
The pooled regression is then: 




























































































where y Is now a (INxl) vector, X Is a (TNx2) matrix , b is a (2x1) 
vector, arid u is the (TNxl) vector of disturbances.
Under the Null hypothesis of unbiased rational expectations, the 
intercept and slope coefficient in b are common for all i, t, namely 0 
and 1. Moreover, rationality implies that there should not be (time) 
serial correlation in the disturbances for all 1 and all |t-s|>k, where 
k is tire number of overlapping forecast periods. However, assuming that 
all forecasters are surprised by the same aggregate shocks to the 
economy, disturbances are correlated across units within each period.
More precisely, the following assumptions have been made:
E(v > =
2r1 for al 1 t=l,...,T ; 1=1....N (4)
E( u u )it jt = PT <rJ for al 1 t and 1 * J- (5)
0 for all 1 and 1t-s|>k
E( u u )It Is 2p or -s,l l for al 1 1 and |t-s|sk
(6)
0 for all 1. J. 1*J, and 1 t-s|>k
E( u u )It js p <r a -® 1 j for all i. J. 1*J, and 1t-s|sk
(7)
This specification allows for heteroscedastleity of the disturbances 
across units, for non-zero contemporaneous correlation between the 
disturbances In different units, and for lagged correlation within and 
between disturbances for overlapping forecast horizons. The common 
correlation coefficient p reflects the assumption of an aggregate shock 
to the economy. The resulting (TNxTN) variance/covarlance matrix for 




























































































r * 0 0
4> r 4 0
0 r 4> 0
4 0
4» r $




(T 0 P , P <r 01 -S,1 -8 l
0 <r P ‘ P 0 o'N -8 -8 , H N
In a first step, individual OLS regressions were run for
individual residual series e . These series were usedi
elements of T and 4> and thus to obtain an estimate of n. 
for <r , p and p are:
I - s
<rl




all i to obtain 





























































































Z co i t  • (N - 1 )
I ( N - 1) 
- U , I J1*1
where is the number of observât Ions with non-missing forecasts for 
both participants i and J and (-s) indicates a lag. In a second step, 
the stacked regression (3) was run with the consistent estimate of the 
variance/covariance matrix:
cov - = (x’xf'x’n x (x’x)D
This is a formulation analogous to the White heteroscedasticity
4consistent variance/covariance estimates with OLS. The results of a 
first round of regressions are summarized in Table 2a. Unbiasedness was 
rejected in all six regressions, even in the third-month-forecast of the 
current quarter. As an additional step, different specifications of the 
variance/covariance matrix 0 were tried to see whether the results are 
sensitive to such changes. Table 2b reports the various t-statlstlcs 
that resulted from different variance/covariance estimates. As can been 
seen, the t-statistics (i.e., the standard error estimates which are not
the computationally most burdensome task was to deal with missing 
observations. Most software would Just cancel all periods containing 
missing obersations. However, with stacked data, the dimension of the 
individual blocks had to be maintained. For the stacked OLS regression, 
consequently zeros were added in both matrix X and vector Y whenever one 
observation was missing which is equivalent to cancelling the 
observation because one adds zero to the explained sum of squares. Care 
must be taken, however, to correct for the true number of observations 
whenever necessary. For the estimation of the elements of Omega, only 
periods were considered where residuals for both of any two individual 
regressions had been obtained. All routines were written in the 




























































































reported since the OLS coefficient estimates are the same) remain 
virtually stable over different specifications of 0.
A possible caveat remains that neither interest rate series nor the 
individual forecast series seem to be stationary (see figures 1 and 3). 
This casts some doubt on the test for unbiasedness. However, the series 
are too short for meaningful analysis of their time series properties 
individually and in relation to each other. This Is a drawback of the 
data which was also chosen to exploit the cross-section dimension. In 
the remainder of this paper, efficiency tests have therefore been chosen 
that make sure that regressands and regressors are stationary series 
under the null hypothesis of Rational Expectations.
4. Testing for Idiosyncracies
A second consequence of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis 
Implies the efficient use of readily available information. Such 
information should not explain forecast errors, otherwise it could have 
been used to Improve the forecast. In this section, a first run of 
regressions is presented that tests for the presence of idiosyncratic 
errors. In these tests the dependent variable, l.e. the idiosyncratic 
forecast error, is stationary under the null hypothesis. The only 
explanatory variable for the time being is a constant —  stationary as 
well. Since we test for idiosyncracies, the data was not pooled. 
Instead, all 23 series of idiosyncratic forecasts errors were regressed 
seperately on a constant. For the current-quarter idiosyncratic 
forecast errors, simple OLS regressions were run:
, I , t ave,t , I I(err^ -err^ ) - 1 4 ut (9)



























































































average forecast error i n period t made in the current period t, y1 is a 
constant, and u* are n.l.l.d. disturbances with mean zero and variance2 t
For the one-quarter-ahead idiosyncratic forecasts errors, the 
standard errors of the 01.S regressions have been corrected allowing for 





( 1 0 )
I 2 Iwhere c is n.i.i.d. with mean zero and variance a and C are the t c, i ^
individual parameters of the MA(1)-process. The consistent
variance/covariance estimate is:
where:
cov. = (X'X r 'x V x  (X’X l'1I 11 t i l lr
2 2 a C a i M 1 0 ... 0
- 2  2 _ 2< a tr < <r i l 1 M l
0 < or1̂ l
_ 2 
i i
_ 2 2C a a î 1 l
The results of these 138 (23x6) individual regressions are summarized in 
tables 3a-f. How does one evaluate the estimation of so many different 




























































































significance level for the null hypothesis of all intercept terms equal 
to zero is to use the Bonferronl t-statistlcs which does not use the 
a-point of the t-distribut ion but the (a/r)-point where r Is the number 
of individual tests.
Applying the Bonferronl criterion to all 138 (23x6) regressions, 
keeping an a=0.05-overal1 significance level, the null hypothesis of no 
idiosyncratic forecast errors for the entrle set of regressions is 
rejected. There are two t-statlstlcs higher than their individual 
critical value, 4.322 for 19 degrees of freedom (participant L) and 
4.278 for 20 degrees of freedom (participant U). The critical values 
come from the tables published by Bailey (1977).
The critical Bonferronl t-statlstlc, keeping a constant 
a=0.05-overal1 significance level for each participant, there are six 
regressions per individual, would be for the average number of degrees 
of freedom approximately 2.984 (the 0.05/6-point of the t-dlstrlbut Ion). 
With this criterion, the null of no idiosyncratic errors is rejected for 
nine out of the 23 survey participants. Note that In most regression 
series constants with different signs result individually significantly 
different from zero. Participants in this survey systematically make 
Idiosyncratic errors in either direction away from the mean forecast.
5. Testing for Efficiency
The implication of the Rational Expectation Hypothesis that 
available information should not be able to statistically explain the 
forecast error —  otherwise it could have been used —  can be extended 
to a variety of explanatory variables. This has been done in the 
present section.
The regression analysis summarized in the following tables has been 
guided by two ideas. The first is to see whether survey forecasts 




























































































information about the predicted var iable. Tire second is to see whether 
tire sample forecasters use economic theory and relationships with other 
variables when predicting interest rates. All regression are pooled, 
with estimated standard errors corrected for correlation among 
forecasters. The covariance matrix for the Whl te-1ike-consistent 
standard errors has been obtained from first-step Individual 
regressions.
The first group of efficiency tests seeked to establish whether 
forecast participants should have moved towards the past average 
forecast published each month alongside the individual forecasts. Table 
4a summarizes the results of pooled regressions of the individual 
forecast errors on the difference between the past average minus the 
Individual forecast. Under the null hypothesis of Rational Exectatlons, 
the regression coefficient of this term should be zero. As can be seen 
in table 4a, the forecast errors are explained to a large extent by the 
failure to exploit the information content in the past mean forecast 
which has implicitly pooled individual information about the variable at 
hand. The corresponding regression coefficients are highly significant 
with t-statlstlcs varying from 4 J to 20.5. To make sure that these 
results are not due to lacking knowledge of the past average, similar 
regressions have been repeated for the difference between the lagged 
past average forecast and the individual prediction, as is summarized In 
table 4b. The coefficient estimates are a little lower but still 
significant in this case.
The second efficiency test seeked to establish whether the 
forecasted change is explained by the past changes in the predicted 
variable. These regressions are summarized in table 5. The survey 
participants clearly use past quarterly changes for prediction purposes, 
that is, they extrapolate. All estimated regression coefficients are 
statistically significant, the explanatory power of past quarterly
changes for the forecasted quarterly change, as measured by the
2R -statistics, ranges from 0.17 to 0.42. Similar regressions were 




























































































monthly change of the discount rate on new 91-day T-Bills. Tables 6a-c 
show the results of three such regressions which produced one 
significant and two non-significant coefficient estimates.
One of the reasons why expectations are not rational might be the 
fact that different economic agents use different theories when 
formulating their forecasts. This Idea has been exploited In the 
efficiency tests summarized In table 7 which regressed the forecast 
error on the past quarter’s spread between the six-month and the 
three-month Treasury Bill. The coefficient estimates are positive, but 
not significant. Statistically significant positive regression 
coefficients would mean that the under-prediction of the Interest rate 
Increases with the spread, i.e., forecasters would not use the term 
structure of the interests rate.
Table 8 summarizes the results of regressions that seeked to 
establish whether forecasters used the Fisher hypothesis that the 
expected real Interest rate Is constant and that expected nominal 
lnterst rate and expected inflation rates move together. As dependent 
variable the idiosyncratic Interest rate forecast was regressed on the 
Idiosyncratic price forecast for the same target period. Again, the 
regression coefficients were not significantly different from zero, 
i.e., there Is no statistically significant, subjective Fisher effect.
6. Revision v s . Precision
The use of survey data for testing the Rational Expectations 
Hypothesis has been generally questioned on the grounds that forecasters 
might not act upon their public announcement in the market place, or, 
that their public forecast might be the solution to a more Intricate 
private optimization problem. This section addresses this possibility. 
Salmon/Waldmann (1991) proposed a prine 1 pal-agent game between financial 




























































































optimization problem. Their model implies that errors in the publicly 
announced forecasts occur systematically and that these errors can be 
predicted by changes from past public forecasts for the same target 
period. The argument would be that the change does not fully reflect 
the true revision because flncanclal consultants are relunctant to admit 
they were wrong with earlier predictions.
The hypothesis can be tested by regressing forecast errors on 
changes In past forecasts for the same target quarter. This Is a 
special case of efficiency test as discussed In section 2, providing a 
rationale for a non-zero coefficient for a variable In the Information 
set known when the forecast was made. It Implies an intercept term of 
zero and a positive regression coefficient on the past changes in the 
l'ol lowing regression:
(X - Xe ) = A A (Xe - X ) 1 l,n t,m-1 ( 11)
where e-superscript, t-superscrlpt now denote public annoucements for
period t; t-subscript is the target quarter and (m-i) Indicates the
month In which the forecasts was made with m>i>0 and m=2,3 and 1 = 1,2;
and u is a n. 1.1. d error term with zero mean and variance <r2 . The *• u
positive regression coefficient means that the forecast could have been 
Improved by adding a (possibly small) constant multiplied by the change 
In the public announcements to adjust for the forecasters’ relunctance 
to revise their earlier forecasts.
Note, that under the Rational Expectations Hypothesis the expected 
value of the coefficient Â  would be zero. Rational Expectations imply 
that changes in expectations follow a random walk. For X*,t” = E




























































































♦ c (13)= X
When pooling the data for regression (11), forecast errors are again 
likely to be correlated across agents. Therefore, the same two-step 
procedure as in section 3 needs to be applied. Individual regressions 
yield individual residual series which. In turn, can be used to estimate 
the error term varlance/covariance matrix Cl for the consistent 
varlance/covarlance estimates of A. The tests were run for current 
quarter forecast errors regressed on the change in the third month 
forecast from the second month forecast, the change of the third from 
the first month forecast, and the change of the second from the first 
month forecast resp. The results are summarized in table 8.
In all three regressions, the coefficients have the wrong sign, and 
significantly so. It does not seem that publicy-announced forecasts 
were meant to mask the unwillingness of forecasters to revise past 
announcements for the same target period. To the contrary, it seems 
that the survey participants over-react in their changes. Subtracting a 
(possibly) small constant multiplied by their change In announcement 
would improve their forecast, not adding as had been hypothesized.
7. Summary
This paper presents some evidence rejecting the conventional 
Rational Expectation Hypothesis. Tests with pooled data of interest 
rate forecasts from a commercial newsletter rejected the implication of 
unbiased forecasts. Tests with the Individual data rejected the null 
hypothesis of no systematic idiosyncratic components in forecast errors.




























































































Implication of Rational Expectations that available information be 
Incorporated In predictions. Survey participants ignored, for example, 
the Information contained in the past average forecast and seemed to 
over-extrapo1 ate past trends In interest rates. However, regressions 
with right-hand side variables as suggested by the different use of 
economic theory when predicting Interest rates did not produce 
statistically significant coefficient estimates. Lastly, an alternative 
behavioral model explaining forecasts errors with the forecasters’ 
unwllllgness to revise previous predictions for the same target period 
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This appendix compares the OLS estimators in tests of unbiasedness as 
used in section (3) for a survey mean forecast and for pooled survey 
data. It is shown that the estimate for the coefficient on the mean
forecast is upward biased as long as there Is the cross-sectional5variation In the Individual forecast.
The OLS estimator for the survey mean Is:
T
Z (Y —Y)(X -X)t t
T _  2
Z (X -X)tt = 1
The OLS estimator for the pooled data is:
3p
T N
Z Z (Y -Y) (X -X)it it
T N _  2
Z Z (X -X)I t
(A.2)
where:
1 1 1 T 1 i T N
N
Z X111=1
, X = --
T
Z Xtt = l N T
z
t = l
Z Xit1 = 1
and:
5This has been noticed first by Dietrich/Joines [1983], and then by 





























































































Y = --- Z Y note that by definition Y a Y .
T 1 = 1 1
T
Expanding the numerator of (A.1), using the definitions of the averages
above, gives:
T T _  _
E (Y -Y)( x  --X) = Z (Y X -  X Y  -  Y X  ♦1 > 4 t X Y )t = l t l L V t= 1
T i T T 1 T T T 1 T 1
=  Z Y X  - 





Y X - ----  Z Z Y X ♦t t _  t t
i T t = 11 = l
E ----
t = l T t
Z Y ----
1 T= 1 T t
T 1 T T 1 T T 1 T T





Y X  -  ----  Z Z Y X  +t t _  t t
i T t = l t = l
----  E
T t = lt
Z Y X  t t
= 1
T 1 T T T 1 T 1 T
=  Z Y X  - - z Y Z X  =  Z Y X  - T ----  E Y ----  Z X
t = i T t = 1 1 t=i t=l T 1 = 1 1 T t = i 1
T ___
E Y X  - T Y X  (A.3)t t
Similarly, expanding the denominator of (A.1), gives:
T _  2 t _ _
I (X -X) = Z (X2 + X2 -2 X X) 
t=l t=l
Z X + T X -2 T --  Z Xt
I t I t
- Z X_ t _ tT 1=1 T t=i




























































































I X  - T Xt111
(A.4)
Expanding the numerator In (A.2), gives:
T N _ _ T N
I I (Y -Y)(X -X) = I I (Y X - YX - XY + YX ) It it it It it itt-l i-l t = l 1=1
1 N T 1 N
N I Y I X  - N Y  I --  I X  - X  I I Y  + T N Y X
t = l 1 N 1=1 11 t=i N 1=1 11 l=lt=l 1
1 T 1 T
N I Y X  - m y —  E X  - N T X --  I Y  + T N Y Xt t T t _ tt=l T t=l T t=i
N I Y X  - N T Y X  = N I Y X  - T Y Xt t t l1=1 t=l
(A.5)
Note, that the nominator of ft is equal to nominator of ft multiplied byp »
N. Hence, ft will only equal ft If there Is an equal relationshipp m
between the denominators. Expanding the denominator of (A. 2) using the 
same trick as before for the denominator of (A.l) gives:
T n _  2
Z I (X -X)itt=l l=l
T N
I I X 2 - T N X 2 l tt=l 1=1
T N T T
I I X 2 - N I X 2 + N I X 2 - T N X 2It t tt=l 1=1 t=1 1=1
N f I X2 - T X2 j + I f I X (2 - N X 2 
t- t = l 1 J t = i  ̂i = i J
[ T —  1 TI x2 - T x2 + I
t=l 1  ̂ t=l
T N T




























































































r T c 1 T H T T
= N 1
[ r x 
L t=. 1
-  T x 2
+ r  1 1 = 1
E X 2 + N E X 2 -1 t t 1=1 t=l
2 N E X2tt = l
r T o
?
-I T N N T T 1 N
N l
[ e  x 2
1 t=. 1
-  T ♦ I
1 t = l
E X 2 + E E X 2 -1 t t 1=1 1=1 t=l
2 N E X  —  
t = i 1 N
-  E X11i = i





-  T x 2
♦ r  
1 1 = 1
E X 2 + E E X 21 t t 1=1 1=1 t=l
-  2 E E X
t=i i=i
: xt 11
r T  5 ■> T N r
[ e  x 2 
L t-. 1
-  T x 2
+ E 1 t = l z  x,t - \ \
(A.6)
Note that the first term in the denominator of ft isp equal to the
denominator of ft multiplied by N. This means, the two estimators are m
only Identical if the second term in (A. 6) vanishes which is only the
case if there is no cross-sectional variation in the forecasts X ofit
the event Y.
Urlch/Wachtel [19841 report the regressions results for the mean of 
all individual equation-(3)-type regressions, the result of the pooled 
regression, and the result of the realization on the survey mean 
forecast.
Estimates ft fto l
Real 1zat ion on 
Forecasts
Mean of Individual
Forecasts -0. 13 0. 78
Pooled Data -0. 12 0.77
Sample Means -0.29 1.06
This shows how important the upward aggregation bias in regressions 





























































































This appendix demonstrates that the conditional expectation Is the 
optimal prediction of a variable if agents have a quadratic loss 
function. Let J be the loss function:
"  2
J = j a £ x - f j  h (x) dx (A.7)
-oo
where a is a constant, x the variable predicted, f the prediction made 
in period t-1, h the conditional probability density function of Xc t
given the information set I. Let additionally be M the conditionalt -1 c
of X̂  given 
I.t -1
00
= J x hf(x) dx
-oo
Then, expanding the loss function gives:
00
J = J a [ x 2 + ( f )2 - 2 x f  | h(x) dx
-oo
CO CO CO
= | a x2 h (x)dx + af2 J h^fxldx - 2af J x h^lx) dx





























































































h (x)dx + af - 2af H ♦ a M a M
[ M  -  f  1 J
0
r 2ax h (x)dx - a M2l c J
[ M  -  f  1
-o








+  a \  M 2  -  2 M 2  ]l  c J1 J-o
1
0
C l  '  c  J




I a (M! - 2M x ) h (x)dxc c
(x - M )2 h (x)dxc c (A.8)
The forecast f only appears In the first term of expression (A.8) so the 
loss function J is minimized by taking





























































































Results from the U.S. T-Bill Auction In the first week of June 1991
"Rates are determined by the difference between the purchased price
AND FACE VALUE. THUS, HIGHER BIDDING NARROWS THE INVESTOR'S RETURN 
WHILE LOWER BIDDING WIDENS IT. THE PERCENTAGE RATES ARE CALCULATED ON A




Accepted at low price 
Accepted noncompet' tly 

























Both issues are dated June 6, 1991. The 13-week bills mature
September 5, 1991. and the 2 6 -week bills mature December 5, 1991."
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Figure 3 - 4
Average Errors
One -  Quarter -  Ahead
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Tests for Unbiasedness of Forecasts 
Dependent Variable: Outcome
Regression Constant Forecast p P lag





2. Current Quarter 0. 49 0.93 0. 18
Second Month (3.57) (3.52)
RZ=0.95
N = 435
3. Current Quarter 0.23 0. 97 0. 11
Third Month (3.05) (3.02)
RZ=0. 98
N = 440
4. One-Q-Ahead 2. 26 0.67 0.78 0. 49
First Month (2.66) (2.76)
RZ=0.63
N = 433
5. One-Q-Ahead 1.85 0.72 0.79 0. 47
Second Month (2.51) (2.64)
RZ=0.73
N = 435
6. One-Q-Ahead 1.34 0. 80 0.65 0. 19
Third Month (2.52) (2.60)
RZ=0.81 
N = 430
*OL.S--estimates with corrected standard errors. In parentheses
t-statistics for the hypothesis of zero coefficient f or the constant






























































































Alternative Specifications for the covariance estimation
Tests for Unbiasedness
1. Current Quarter t for t for Var Covar
First Month Constant Forecast
a. Single Var, 
Single Covar
2.93 2.80 0. 088 0.039
b. Var Free, 
Single Covar
2.93 2.81
c. Var Free, 
Covar Free
2.94 2.82
2. Current Quarter t for t for Var Covar
Second Month Constant Forecast
a. Single Var, 
Single Covar
4.01 3.93 0.053 0.0054
b. Var Free, 
Single Covar
3.96 3.89
c. Var Free, 
Covar Free
3.93 3. 87
3. Current Quarter t for t for Var Covar
Third Month Constant Forecast
a. Single Var, 
Single Covar
2.86 2. 82 0. 024 0.0026
b. Var Free, 
Single Covar
2.85 2. 81































































































4. One-Q-Ahead t for
First Month Constant
a. Single Var, 
Single Covar
2.60
b. Var Free, 
Single Covar
2.60
c. Var Free, 
Covar Free
2.59
5. One-Q-Ahead t for
Second Month Constant
a. Single Var, 
Single Covar
2. 51
b. Var Free, 
Single Covar
2. 50
c. Var Free, 
Covar Free
2. 49
6. One-Q-Ahead t for
Third Month Constant
a. Single Var, 
Single Covar
2. 48
b. Var Free, 
Single Covar
2.47
c. Var Free, 
Covar Free
2.47
t for Var Covar
Forecast VI ag Co lag
2.70 0.341 0.241
0. 158 0. 176
2.70
2.68
t for Var Covar
Forecast VI ag Co lag




t for Var Covar
Forecast VI ag Co lag
































































































Dependent Variable: Idiosyncratic Error (err -err )
1 a v e
Tests for Idiosyncratic Bias
Regression Constant t for 1
Current Quarter 
First Month
1. Part ici pant A -0.158 -3. 447'
2. Participant B 0.078 2.824
3. Part ici pant C -0.107 -1.730
4. Participant D -0.013 -0.291
5. Part ici pant E -0.068 -0.994
6. Partiel pant F -0.010 -0. 322
7. Participant C -0.154 -1.891
8. Part lei pant H 0.024 0.546
9. Participant 1 -0.015 -0.143
10. Participant J 0.055 0. 782
11. Partiel pant K -0.062 -1.355
12. Participant L 0. 172 3.233
13. Participant M 0.015 0. 251
14. Participant N 0.068 2. 459
15. Participant 0 -0.036 -0.646
16. Participant P 0.122 3.087
17. Participant Q 0.060 1.266
18. Participant R -0.014 -0.187
19. Part ici pant S -0.009 -0.342
20. Participant T 0. 163 * 2.306
21. Participant U -0.027 -0.593
22. Participant V 0.017 0. 355
23. Partiel pant X -0.066 -1.133
• tOLS regressions. Data as described in section 2. Rejects for the





























































































Dependent Variable: Idiosyncratic Error (err -err )
I a ve
Tests for Idiosyncratic Bias
Regression Constant t for Hq: j =0
Current Quarter 
Second Month
1. Participant A -0.146 -3.290
2. Participant B -0.023 -0.692
3. Participant C •-0.053 -0.929
4. Participant D -0.018 -1.098
5. Participant E 0.005 0. 162
6. Part ici pant F -0.032 -1.779
7. Participant C -0.061 -1.850
8. Participant H -0.045 -0.990
9. Participant 1 0. 154 1. 199
10. Participant J -0.099 -1.861
11. Part ici pant K -0.033 -1.122
12. Participant L 0.057 1.295
13. Participant M 0.066 1.413
14. Participant N -0.001 -0.027
IS. Participant 0 -0.022 -0.875
16. Part lei pant P 0.096 2. 401
17. Participant Q -0.016 -0.646
18. Part lei pant R 0.044 1.243
19. Participant S -0.024 -1.601
20. Participant T 0.207 2.328
21. Participant U 0.029 0. 895
22. Participant V -0.018 -0.354
23. Part ici pant X -0.070 -2.388
OLS regressions. Data as described in section
individual at the a=0.05-overal1 significance level
t






























































































Dependent Variable: Idiosyncratic Error (err -err )
1 a ve
Tests for Idiosyncratic Bias
Regression Constant t for 1
Current Quarter 
Third Month
1 . Participant A -0.044 -1.459
2. Partiel pant B 0.018 1.639
3. Part ici pant C -0.016 -0.515
4. Part lei pant D -0.026 -0.638
5. Partiel pant E 0.018 0. 821
6. Participant F 0.034 1.404
7. Participant C -0.065 -2.509
8. Participant II -0.103 -2.089
9. Part ici pant I 0.027 0. 468
10. Partiel pant J 0. 103 1.631
11. Participant K -0.044 -2.076
12. Participant L 0.029 1.272
13. Participant M 0. 128 3.216
14. Participant N -0.004 -0.169
15. Partiel pant 0 -0.007 -0.381
16. Partiel pant P 0.078 2.026
17. Participant Q - 0 .011 -0.478
18. Participant R -0.022 -0.844
19. Partiel pant S 0.005 0.594
20. Participant T 0.022 0. 388
21. Part lei pant U -0.021 -0.910
22. Partiel pant V -0.022 -0.736
23. Part ici pant X -0.021 -0.998
• tOLS regressions. Data as described In section 2. Rejects for the





























































































Dependent Variable: Idiosyncratic Error (err -err )
l #vc
Tests for Idiosyncratic Bias
Regression Constant t for H : 3=0 0 MA( 1)
One-Q-Ahead 
First Month
1. Participant A -0.325 -2.277 0. 485
2. Participant B 0. 176 3.251* -0.064
3. Participant C -0.255 -0.759 0. 459
4. Participant D -0.071 -0.724 0. 274
5. Participant E -0.050 -0.291 0. 509
6. Part lei pant F 0. 101 1.430 0. 151
7. Participant C -0.487 -2.337 0. 477
8. Part ici pant H 0. 114 1.302 0. 143
9. Participant 1 0. 191 0. 932 0. 189
10. Participant J -0.121 -0.625 0.799
11. Participant K -0.015 -0.10S 0.571
12. Part lei pant L 0. 372 5.531** -0.024
13. Participant M -0. 106 -0.592 0.248
14. Participant N 0. 205 3.321* 0. 109
15. Participant 0 -0.115 -1.151 0. 183
16. Participant P 0. 309 3.680* 0. 202
17. Part ici pant Q 0. 176 1.376 0. 133
18. Participant R -0.042 -0.394 -0.110
19. Participant S -0.001 -0.016 0. 188
20. Participant T 0. 446 3.172* 0.576
21. Participant U -0.121 -1.490 0. 168
22. Participant V -0.038 -0.318 0.221
23. Participant X -0.275 -2.311 0.280
*0LS regressions allowing for MA(1)-error structure. Data as described
in section 2. 4 Rejects for the individual at the a=0.05-overal1 
significance level for six regressions. 44 Rejects for the entire set 





























































































Tests for Idiosyncratic Bias
Dependent Variable: Idiosyncratic Error (err -err1 ave)
Regression Constant t for H : 0 3=0 MA(1)
One-Q-Ahead 
Second Month
l. Part ici pant A -0.268 -2.843 0. 409
2. Part lei pant B 0.057 1.326 -0.057
3. Part icipant C -0.173 -2.227 0.061
4. Part ici pant D -0.065 -0.917 0. 189
5. Part ici pant E -0.168 -1.815 0. 280
6. Part icipant F -0.039 -1.108 -0.283
7. Part icipant G -0.310 -2.228 0. 327
8. Part icipant H -0.056 -1.249 -0.480
9. Part icipant I 0. 413 1.907 0.260
10. Part icipant J -0.257 -1.817 0. 496
11. Part icipant K 0.001 0.014 0.529
12. Part iclpant L 0.237 3.889* -0.094
13. Part icipant H -0. 124 -0.864 0. 192
14. Part lclpant N 0. 170 3.174* -0.062
15. Part icipant 0 -0.062 -1.225 -0. 148
16. Part icipant P 0. 202 2.098 0. 516
17. Part icipant Q 0.066 0. 405 0. 719
18. Part icipant R 0. 119 3.039* -0.149
19. Part lclpant S -0.008 -0.132 -0.071
20. Part lclpant T 0. 472 2.741 0. 385
21. Part ici pant U -0.001 0.001 0. 140
22. Part icipant V -0.065 -0.653 0.053
23. Part ici pant X -0.164 -1.230 0.414
*OLS regressions 
in section 2.
allowing for MA(l)-error structure. 





significance level for six regressions. t t  Rejects for the entire set





























































































Dependent Variable: Idiosyncratic Error (err -err )
1 • VO
Tests for Idiosyncratic Bias
Regression Constant t for Hq: 6=0 MA-Parameter
One-Q-Ahead 
Third Month
l. Participant A -0.165 -1.739 0.440
2. Participant B 0.008 0. 158 0. 396
3. Participant C -0.082 -1.254 -0.006
4. Participant D -0.037 -0.853 -0.114
5. Participant E -0.037 -0.325 0.531
7. Participant G -0.220 -2.132 0.228
8. Participant H -0.024 -0.339 -0.090
9. Participant I 0. 141 0.855 0.213
10. Participant J -0.088 -0.818 0.573
11. Participant K -0.057 -0.961 0. 386
12. Participant L 0.243 3. 102* 0.092
13. Participant M 0. 147 1.457 0.007
14. Participant N 0. 138 2. 436 0. 266
IS. Participant 0 -0.005 -0.504 0.606
16. Part lc 1 pant P 0 187 2.521 0. 323
17. Participant Q 0. 121 0.961 0.259
18. Participant R 0.014 0.316 0. 115
19. Participant S -0.072 -1.307 0.074
20. Participant T 0.273 3.151* -0.185
21. Part lei pant U -0.098 -4.846** -0.367
22. Participant V -0.081 -1.635 -0.033
23. Participant X -0.193 -2.088 0. 138
•OLS regressions al 1owing for MA( l)-error structure. Data as described
in section 2. t Rejects for the Individual at the a=0.05-overal1
significance level for six regressions. ♦♦ Rejects for the entire set





























































































Tests for Efficiency using Past Average Forecast
Dependent Variable: Forecast Error (Outcome^-Forecast^)
Regression Constant Difference
Pastave-Fore





2. Current Quarter 0.029 0.601
2nd Month (1.134) (10.92)
N=435 R2=0.46
3. Current Quarter 0.013 0.783
3rd Month (1.111) (20.50)
N=419 RZ=0.77
OLS regressions with corrected standard errors. In 
t-statlstlcs for the null hypothesis of zero coefficient on 



































































































Tests for Efficiency using lagged Past Average Forecast












2. Current Quarter 0.010 0.260
2nd Month (0.451) (5.249)
N=435 RZ=0.21
3. Current Quarter 0.013 0.374
3rd Month (0.954) (8.279)
N=419 RZ=0. 39
OLS regressions with corrected standard errors. In 
t-statlstlcs for the null hypothesis of zero coefficient on 



































































































Dependent Variable: Forecasted Change (Forecast^-Outcome^ ^
Tests for Extrapolation
Regression Constant Past Change
in Outcome






2. Current Quarter -0.003 0.615
2nd Month’s (-0.042) (4.519)
Forecasted Change
N=435 RZ=0.42
3. Current Quarter -0.097 0.438
3rd Month’s (-0.896) (2.230)
Forecasted Change
N=440 RZ=0. 17
OLS regressions with corrected standard errors. In 
t-statistics for the null hypothesis of zero coefficient on 





































































































Dependent Variable: Forecasted Change (Forecast^ ^Outcome^)










Dependent Variable: Forecasted Change (Forecast^ ^-Outcome^)
Regression Constant Past Change in 
Monthly Outcome
Current Quarter -0.022 -0.086
2nd Month’s (-1.054) (-1.001)
Forecasted Change
on (out -out ) N=435 R =0.01t.t t-1.3
Tests for Efficiency
Dependent Variable: Forecasted Change (Forecast^ ^-Outcome^)




Forecasted Change on 










OLS regression with corrected standard errors. In parentheses 
t-statistlcs for the null hypothesis of zero coefficients for the 
constant and the change term. Data as described in section 2. The 





























































































Dependent Variable: Forecast Error (Outcome^-Forecast^)
Tests for Efficiency using the Past Spread
Regression Constant Past-Quarter Corr
Spread








2. Current Quarter 
2nd Month





3. Current Quarter 
3rd Month





OL.S regressions with corrected standard errors. In parentheses 
t-statistics for the null hypothesis of zero coefficient on constant and 





























































































Dependent Variable: Idiosyncratic Forecast (Fore^-Foreave^)
Tests for Efficiency using own Price Forecasts
Regression Constant Idiosyncratic Corr
Price Fore















OLS regressions with corrected standard errors. In parentheses 
t-statlstlcs for the null hypothesis of zero coefficient on constant and 





























































































Tests for Efficiency using own Changes in Forecasts
Dependent Variable: Forecast Error (outcome-forecast)




3rd Month’s Error 










2nd Month’s Error 










3rd Month’s Error 









OL.S regressions with corrected standard errors. In parentheses, 
t-statistics for the null hypothesis of zero coefficient on constant and 
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